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AIPLA QUARTERL y JOURNAL 
VOLUME 23, NUMBER 1 PAGE 61 WINTER 1995 
REPLY TO COMMENTS ON THE PATENT ABILITY OF 
CERTAIN INVENTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIAL cDNA SEQUENCES 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg 
Robert P. Merges· 
A brief reply is in order to clarify our position on the patenting of 
research tools. 
We stand by the statement that "there are reasons to be wary of 
patents on research tools,"1 but that statement should not be understood as 
a broad condemnation of patents on research tools in all contexts. Indeed, 
immediately after the cited language our opinion letter acknowledges that 
withholding patent protection from research tools could undermine private 
incentives to develop research tools and to make them available to 
investigators or lead to greater reliance on trade secrecy. Unlike the 
government, which purports to pursue patent rights for the purpose of 
facilitating technology transfer, private firms pursue patents in order to earn 
a return on investments in R&D that would otherwise be unprofitable. Thus, 
even in cases where patents do nothing to facilitate technology transfer, 
private firms may invoke justifications for their claims of proprietary rights 
in the results of research that they have paid for. These justifications have 
considerably less force when applied to the results of research paid for by 
the government. 
· © 1996 Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Robert P. Merges. 
1 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the 
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial 
cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. l, 19 (1995). 
62 AIPLAQ.J. Vol. 23: 61 
Nonetheless, we disagree with Dr. Chambers' statement that 
"[p]atents that cover research tools are no more qangerous than patents that 
cover any other aspect of human endeavor."2 
The primary difficulty with patents or other proprietary rights in 
research tools is that they can be used to restrict access to discoveries that are 
likely to have the greatest social value if they are widely disseminated to 
researchers who are taking different approaches to different problems. True 
believers in intellectual property might argue that if widespread 
dissemination is socially valuable, patent owners will be well motivated to 
disseminate their research tools widely through licensing. Indeed, in many 
cases, owners of patents on research tools will perceive researchers as 
customers for their patented products. For example, owners of patents on 
research reagents will generally maximize their profits by making the 
reagents widely available to anyone who wants them in anonymous market 
transactions. Even when researchers are not ordinary consumers of a 
patented invention, patent owners may welcome the use of their inventions 
by researchers, perhaps hoping that their research efforts will enhance the 
value of the patented inventions. 
But there .�re reasons to fear that we can not always rely on a market 
for licenses to achieve optimal di�semination of research tools. For one 
thing, not all research tools are of a character that permits widespread 
distribution in an anonymous market. Sometimes face-to-face negotiations 
will be necessary in order to secure a license and, in these cases, researchers 
may be called upon to disclose what it is that they plan to do with the 
patented research tools before they are ready to do so. Researchers who do 
not want to disclose the directions of their research in its early stages may be 
reluctant to tip their hand by requesting a license. 
Moreover, a significant research project might require access to a 
great many research tools. If each of these tools requires a separate license 
and royalty payment, the costs and administrative burden could mount 
quickly. This could be a particularly unattractive outcome for an institution 
such as NIH that may find itself in the position of royalty-payor in its role as 
research sponsor at least as often as it finds itself in the position of royaltee-
2 Scott A. Chambers, Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions 
Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 53, 
53 (1995). 
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payee in its role as patent holder. More troubling still, owners of patents on 
research tools may find it more lucrative to license their patents on an 
exclusive basis rather than on a non-exclusive basis, a strategy that could 
choke other research efforts before they get off the ground. 
Dr. Chambers suggests that the downside risk of patents on research 
tools is minimal because the courts have the equitable power to withhold 
injunctive relief against researchers. But in spite of the equitable character 
of injunctive relief, there is only a small handful of cases in which courts 
have withheld permanent injunctions once patent infringement is proven, 
and researchers would be foolish to count on getting such a break. And even 
if at the end of the day researchers are able to beat the odds and avoid 
injunctive relief, the prospect of a damage remedy alone can be expected to 
deter socially productive uses of research tools. 
We concede that proprietary rights may enhance incentives to 
develop further research tools in the private sector, and it may be that on 
balance the research enterprise will benefit more from the development of 
these new tools than it loses by allowing those who develop research tools 
to restrict access to them. Surely it is better to have research tools available 
on a restricted basis than it is to have them entirely unavailable because they 
don't exist. But this argument is only persuasive to the extent that, in the 
absence of patents, research tools would not be developed. 
When the government is picking up the tab, it may be better still to 
have research tools freely available in the public domain. Government is 
uniquely situated to enrich the public domain, a fact that we should not lose 
sight of in the prevailing climate of enthusiasm for private appropriation of 
government-sponsored research discoveries. 
We do not urge these considerations upon the PTO in its 
determinations of what is patentable, but we believe they are appropriate 
considerations for a public institution such as NIH to weigh in deciding 
when it should pursue patents on its own discoveries, and when it would be 
wiser to dedicate those discoveries to the public domain. 

